Ecuador is getting ready for the second presidential voting round on April 2nd. Amid the political diatribe typical of an election, the strong delay in broadcasting the results of February 19th – only made final on March 7th- cast doubts on the performance of the National Electoral Council (CNE).
The mistrust is rooted on the CNE’s decision to improvise with the vote counting technology during the elections last month, despite having tested two e-voting systems during their Sectional Elections just three years ago; one of them, used in Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas produced results in only 50 minutes, while Azuay had them in 90.
In the face of these successful experiences, it is inexplicable that Ecuador went for a vote scanning solution using Korean scanners that had never been tested in an election, instead of following the roadmap set in 2014, when they used electoral technology that kept the election safe and emitted exact and quick results.
The imminent execution of the second voting round forbids any substantial changes to the counting mechanism chosen by the CNE. The organism’s highest authority, Juan Pablo Pozo, has admitted mistakes but foresees no changes in the medium or long term, which leaves it up to the citizens and political parties to pressure the organism into change.
The objective of the tests electoral commissions carry out to try different technologies is precisely being able to compare and evaluate the success factors of an automated election: speed, exactness and security. The Ecuadorian CNE could compare the elections in Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas and Azuay in 2014 versus the past February 19th elections and all the days the vote counting took; in the former cases, it took no longer than 72 hours to reach an irreversible official trend, whereas for the latter it took days.
The Korean machines and the transmission system used in the first round of the Ecuadorean presidential elections had never been used to tally votes. The question is, then: Why, if Ecuador – and Juan Pablo Pozo himself – knows and has tested a technology that guarantees fast and transparent results, did it go for gifted machines that could not fulfil the objective of delivering a fast and secure count? What is the cost of an election whose results are questioned?
Finding an answer to these questions should be the goal of political activists and citizens: focusing on showing that Ecuador deserves proper and secure technology like the kind it employed in 2014.